E 

475 
.55 

M4 


THE  LIBRARY 
OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 


GIFT  OF 

Mrs,  Arthur  Joiy 


DID  GENERAL  MEADE  DESIRE  TO  RETREAT 
AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  GETTYSBURG? 


BY 


GEORGE   MEADE, 
n 

FORMERLY    CAPTAIN    AND    AIDE-DE-CAMP    AND    BREVET    LIEUT. -COL.  U.  S.   ARMY. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

PORTER   &    COATES. 
1888. 


COLLINS  PRINTING  HOUSE, 
705  Jayue  Street. 


•iilFT 


.55 

AU 


I  DTD  not  see  or  hear  of  the  letter  of  General  Abner  Doubleday, 
published  in  the  "New  York  Times"  of  April  1st,  until  my  attention 
was  called  to  it  nearly  a  month  afterward.  But,  in  view  of  the  fact 
of  my  previous  silence,  when  General  Doubleday  has  discussed  the 
same  topic,  that  does  not  account  for  my  noticing  it  now  or  at  all.  I 
begin,'  therefore,  with  an  apology  for  breaking  that  long  silence, 
induced  by  the  conviction  that  he  had  manifestly  to  the  world  failed 
to  substantiate  the  assertions  made  in  his  history  of  the  battle  of 
Gettysburg.  I  have  been  actuated,  heretofore,  by  the  belief  that 
"no  man  was  ever  written  out  of  reputation  but  by  himself,"  and  the 
belief  that  I  might  safely  commit  that  task  to  General  Doubleday. 
But  there  comes  a  time  when,  in  the  individual  case,  it  becomes  a 
debatable  question  whether  this  view  may  not  be  pushed  too  far,  when 
for  instance,  as  at  present,  the  living,  as  being  alive,  has  to  that  extent 
a  signal  advantage  over  the  dead.  This  I  hold  to  be  a  good  and  suf 
ficient  reason  for  breaking  a  silence  which  has  been  maintained  in 
deference  to  a  general  belief  among  friends,  in  which  I  no  longer 
share,  that  it  was  simply  not  worth  while  to  take  notice  of  these  attacks. 
They  shall  no  longer  have  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  of  being  harmless. 
If  they  be  not  harmless,  it  were  well  worth  while  to  prove  them 
groundless,  which  I  proceed  to  do  from  undisputed  facts,  and  from  the 
enormously  preponderating  weight  of  testimony  against  them. 

That  the  reader  may  have  a  clear  idea  of  the  question  at  issue,  it 
is  well  to  premise  that  it  is  asserted  by  a  little  clique  of  dissatisfied 
spirits,  who  find  in  General  Doubleday  a  convenient  and  willing  instru 
ment,  that  General  Meade  desired  and  intended  to  retreat  from  the 
field  of  Gettysburg  throughout  nearly  the  whole  of  the  2d  of  July, 
1863.  It  has  been  attempted  to  prove  this  in  various  ways,  in  face  of 
General  Meade's  well-known  conduct  on  that  day,  of  his  official  orders 
and  despatches,  and  of  his  solemn  protestation  to  the  contrary  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  in  1804,  where  the  charge 
of  his  having  intended  to  retreat  was  first  distinctly  formulated.  Al 
though  those  engaged  in  maintaining  this  charge  have  devoted  to  it 
nearly  twenty  years,  although  during  that  time  they  had  the  moral 
support  of  the  controlling  element  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 


.sin 


of  the  War,  free  access  to  all  the  records  of  the  War  Department,  and 
ample  opportunity  to  confer  with  all  the  officers  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  who  had  been  present  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg;  and,  dur 
ing  the  last  ten  years,  have  had  the  decided  advantage  that  he  whose 
reputation  is  assailed  has  lain  dead  in  his  grave,  yet,  as  Mr.  Swinton 
says,  in  his  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  when  referring 
to  the  late  work  of  General  Doubleday,  he  "does  not  produce  one 
scintilla  of  testimony  in  support  of  his  accusation,"  to  refute  which 
assertion  is  the  ostensible  motive  of  General  Doubleclay's  late  letter. 

In  order  to  show  how  utterly  inconsistent  all  General  Meade's 
actions  were  with  any  such  intention  as  that  ascribed  to  him  by  Gen 
eral  Doubleday,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  retrospective  view  of  what 
occurred  just  previous  to  the  time  specified  by  General  Doubleday. 

On  the  evening  of  July  1st,  1863,  General  Meade  was  at  Taney- 
town,  distant  from  Gettysburg  about  thirteen  miles.  He  had  made 
every  exertion  to  hasten  the  troops  to  the  front,  and  was  preparing  to 
go  to  Gettysburg  in  person,  when  General  Hancock,  just  returned  from 
the  front,  reported  to  him.  That  officer's  report  as  to  the  advantages 
of  the  ground  for  fighting  a  battle  there,  and  as  to  the  dispositions  that 
had  been  made,  confirmed  him  in  his  intention  of  fighting  there,  and 
determined  him  upon  proceeding  at  once  to  that  place.  He  sent  out 
additional  orders,  urging  the  rapid  advance  of  the  corps  which  had 
not  yet  reached  Gettysburg,  and  soon  afterward  started  for  the  front, 
arriving  at  the  Cemetery  about  1  A.  M.,  July  2d,  stopping  for  a  few 
moments  only  on  the  way,  to  order  General  Gibbon,  temporarily  com 
manding  the  Second  Corps,  to  move  forward  as  soon  as  it  was  daylight. 
After  a  conference  with  General  Howard  and  other  officers,  as  soon 
as  objects  could  be  distinguished,  General  Meade  made  a  personal 
inspection  of  the  lines.  He  fully  approved  of  the  position  as  selected, 
and  issued  his  orders  for  the  posting  of  the  various  corps  as  soon  as 
they  should  arrive  upon  the  field.  At  9.30  A.  M.,  the  Fifth  Corps 
having  in  the  mean  time  arrived  and  been  posted  on  the  right  of  the 
Twelfth  Corps,  General  Meade  sent  a  despatch  to  General  Slocum  to  ex 
amine  at  once  the  ground  in  his  front  with  reference  to  the  practicability 
of  attacking  the  enemy  in  that  quarter.  At  10  A.  M.  this  was  followed 
by  an  order  to  General  Slocum  to  make  arrangements  for  an  attack 
from  his  front  with  his  own  and  the  Fifth  Corps.  General  Meade 
expressed  his  intention  to  General  Slocum  that  this  should  be  a 
"strong  and  decisive  attack,"  which  he  would  order  made  as  soon  as 
he  received  definite  information  of  the  approach  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
which  corps  he  intended  should  cooperate  in  the  attack.  The  attack 


contemplated  was,  however,  abandoned,  owing  to  the  fact  that  General 
Slocum,  as  also  General  Warren,  General  Meade's  Chief  Engineer, 
who  had  been  sent  to  confer  with  General  Slocum,  advised  against  it. 
General  Meade  then  decided  to  move  the  Fifth  Corps  to  the  left  as 
soon  as  the  Sixth  Corps  had  arrived,  and  to  attack  from  that  wing, 
providing  that  the  enemy  did  not  in  the  mean  time  attack.  The  inter 
val  before  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps  was  made  use  of  in  examin 
ing  the  ground  in  the  vicinity,  in  perfecting  the  line,  in  strengthening 
the  position,  and  in  allowing  the  troops  a  much  needed  rest  after  their 
constant  and  arduous  marching  since  General  Meade  had  assumed 
command  of  the  army.  As  soon  as  the  arrival  of  the  Sixth  Corps 
was  reported,  the  Fifth  Corps  was  ordered  to  the  left.  At  3  P.  M. 
General  Meade  sent  the  following  despatch  to  General  Halleck:  — 

HEADQUARTERS  NEAR  GETTYSBURG, 
July  2,  1863,  3  P.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK,  General-in-Chief: 

I  have  concentrated  my  army  at  this  place  to-day.  The  Sixth 
Corps  is  just  coming  in,  very  much  worn  out,  having  been  marching 
since  9  P.  M.  last  night. 

The  army  is  fatigued.  I  have  to-day,  up  to  this  hour,  awaited  the 
attack  of  the  enemy,  I  having  a  strong  position  for  defensive.  I  am 
not  determined  as  yet  on  attacking  him  till  his  position  is  more  devel 
oped,  lie  has  been  moving  on  both  my  flanks  apparently,  but  it  is 
difficult  to  tell  exactly  his  movements.  I  have  delayed  attacking  to 
allow  the  Sixth  Corps  and  parts  of  other  corps  to  reach  this  place  and 
rest  the  men.  Expecting  a  battle,  I  ordered  all  my  trains  to  the  rear. 
If  not  attacked,  and  I  can  get  any  positive  information  of  the  position 
of  the  enemy  which  will  justify  me  in  so  doing,  I  shall  attack.  If  I  find 
it  hazardous  to  do  so,  or  am  satisfied  the  enemy  is  endeavoring  to 
move  to  my  rear  and  interpose  between  me  and  Washington,  I  shall 
fall  back  to  my  supplies  at  Westminster.  I  will  endeavor  to  advise 
you  as  often  as  possible.  In  the  engagement  yesterday  the  enemy 
concentrated  more  rapidly  than  we  could,  and  towards  evening,  owing 
to  the  superiority  of  numbers,  compelled  the  Eleventh  and  First  Corps 
to  fall  back  from  the  town  to  the  heights  this  side,  on  which  I  am  now 
posted.  I  feel  fully  the  responsibility  resting  on  me,  but  will  endeavor 
to  act  with  caution. 

GEORGE  G.  MEADE, 

Major-General. 

As  soon  as  the  Sixth  Corps  had  in  the  main  arrived,  and  whilst  the 
Fifth  Corps  was  still  moving  to  the  left,  General  Meade,  shortly 
before  4  P.  M.,  rode  to  that  part  of  the  line,  "  with  the  view,"  as 
he  says  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  "  of  ascertaining  as  far  as  I  could  the  position  of  my  own  troops 


and  the  troops  of  the  enemy,  and  with  the  intention  of  ordering  an 
attack  from  there  if  the  enemy  did  not  themselves  attack." 

We  have  now,  he  it  observed,  reached  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon — that  is,  within  one  hour  of  the  time  when,  as  General  Double- 
day  would  have  it,  General  Meade  indicated  the  intention  of  retreating. 
There  is  nothing  as  yet,  it  must  be  admitted,  that  seems  to  indicate 
an  intention  or  even  desire  to  retreat,  or  even  to  withdraw  from  the 
position  at  Gettysburg.  On  the  contrary,  we  have  not  only  seen  that 
the  army  was  pushed  forward  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Gettysburg, 
with  the  expressed  intention  of  fighting  there,  and  that  one  attack 
had  been  ordered,  and  only  countermanded  upon  the  report  of  the 
two  officers  who  had  examined  the  field  in  their  front,  but,  in  addition, 
that  General  Meade  had  despatched  to  General  Halleck  that  he  would 
take  the  offensive  if  the  enemy  delayed  doing  so  ;  and  we  find  him  an 
hour  afterward  proceeding  to  the  left  of  the  line  with  that  object  in 
view. 

Incredible  as  it  may  appear,  it  is  during  the  time  between  9.30 
A.M.  and  4  P.M.,  which  General  Butterfield,  in  his  testimony  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  specifies  as  the  interval 
within  which  General  Meade  gave  him  instructions  to  make  out  an  or 
der  to  withdraw  the  army.  Why  General  Meade  should  at  that  time 
have  wished  to  retire,  or  having  wished  to  retire,  did  not,  has  never 
been  explained.  It  is  not  necessary  to  the  present  issue  to  discuss 
this  statement,  but  merely  to  say  that  General  Meade,  when  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  denied  emphatically  ever 
having  given  General  Butterfield  any  such  instructions,  and  showed 
so  conclusively  that  such  could  not  have  been  his  intention,  that  this 
assertion  is  too  much  for  even  General  Doubleday  to  adopt,  who  does 
not  hesitate  to  accept  General  Butterfield's  statement  on  almost  every 
other  point,  and  who  usually  does  not  scruple  to  retail,  if  it  will  reflect 
upon  General  Meade,  any  scrap  of  idle  gossip  as  matter  of  veracious 
history. 

General  Meade  had  hardly  arrived  on  the  part  of  the  field  to 
the  left,  just  in  rear  of  the  advanced  position  assumed  by  General 
Sickles  with  the  Third  Corps,  and  engaged  in  conference  with  that 
officer,  when  the  enemy  opened  his  batteries  on  the  Corps,  and 
made  a  most  vigorous  and  determined  attack  on  that  part  of  the  line, 
and  the  battle  soon  became  general  along  the  whole  line. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  details  regarding  the  terrible 
struggle  which  ensued,  and  which  lasted  until  long  after  dark.  We 
are  concerned  only  with  the  action  of  General  Meade  on  that  memor- 


able  day,  and  with  that  action  only  so  far  as  it  is  impugned  by  Gene 
ral  Doubleday.  The  general  history  of  that  day's  fight  is  well 
known.  To  the  valor  and  admirable  fighting  of  our  troops,  to  the 
gallantry  and  hearty  cooperation  of  the  superior  officers,  and  to  the 
skilful  handling  of  the  army  are  owing  that  this  determined  attack 
of  the  enemy  was  repulsed,  our  lines  maintained,  and  he  driven  from 
the  field.  General  Meade,  in  constant  communication  with  all  the 
prominent  officers  who  were  engaged  there,  remained  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  engagement  on  and  about  that  part  of  the  field  where 
the  enemy's  attack  was  made.  That  he  was  fully  alive  to  the  emer 
gency  is  evidenced  by  the  promptness  with  which  he  brought  forward 
reinforcements,  some  of  which  he  led  personally  to  the  line  of  battle, 
and  by  his  strenuous  exertions  in  reforming  his  line  and  maintaining 
his  position. 

Yet  General  Doubleday,  continuing  to  criticize  Mr.  Swinton's 
statements,  makes  the  assertion  that,  during  all  this  time  General 
Meade  was  desirous  of  retreating,  and  he  emphasizes  it  by  italics. 
"  This  desire  to  retreat  was  supplemented,"  he  says,  "by  acts  which 
form  part  of  the  history  of  the  battle."  The  only  way  in  which  this 
statement  is  reconcilable  with  fact  isj  that  General  Doubleday  refers 
to  his  own  history  of  the  battle.  As  the  only  evidence,  however,  of 
his  statement,  he  produces  a  letter  of  February  8,  188o,  from  Gene 
ral  Alfred  Pleasonton,  in  which  he  says,  that — 

"General  Meade,  on  the  2d  of  July,  1863,  at  Gettysburg,  about 
"  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  gave  me  the  order  to  get  what  cavalry 
"  and  artillery  I  could,  as  soon  as  possible,  and  take  up  a  position  in 
"  rear  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army  from  Gettysburg.  I  was 
"  thus  occupied  until  ten  o'clock  at  night,  when  I  was  recalled  by  an 
"  order  from  General  Meade." 

Now,  there  is  nothing  on  record  that  warrants  either  this  assertion 
of  General  Doubleday's,  or  the  statement  embodied  in  General  Pleas- 
onton's  letter  quoted  by  him.  There  are  no  orders  on  file  that  even 
indicate  such  a  design.  There  is  no  mention  of  or  allusion  to  it  in 
any  way  in  the  official  report  of  General  Meade,  or  of  any  other 
general  officer,  including  that  of  General  Pleasonton  himself.  There 
is  no  mention  of  or  allusion  to  it  in  the  testimony  of  any  of  the  officers 
who  appeared,  in  the  spring  of  1864,  before  the  Committee  on  the 
Conduct  of  the  War,  including  that  of  General  Pleasonton  himself; 
and  certainly  it  was  made  amply  apparent  that  that  Committee  sought 
for  anything  that  might  even  by  implication  cast  discredit  upon  the 
commander  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac;  and,  judging  from  their  tes- 


8 

timony,  Generals  Doubleday  and  Pleasonton  were  in  full  sympathy 
with  the  Committee.  There  is  no  officer,  besides  General  Pleason 
ton,  who  received  at  that  time,  as  he  alleges  he  did,  an  intimation 
from  General  Meade  that  he  desired  or  intended  to  retreat.  Strange 
that,  of  all  the  officers  in  high  command  in  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
General  Pleasonton  should  have  been  the  only  one  to  whom  General 
Meade  communicated  his  design! 

Let  us  now  see  what  reliance  is  to  be  placed  on  the  statement  of 
this  witness  of  General  Doubleday's.  General  Pleasonton,  in  answer 
to  the  question  conveyed  to  him  in  the  note  from  General  Doubleday, 
answers,  as  we  have  seen,  that  about  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
July  2d,  he  was  ordered  to  take  up  a  position  in  the  rear,  to  cover 
the  retreat  of  the  army  from  Gettysburg,  and  that  he  was  engaged 
in  this  duty  until  ten  o'clock  that  night.  Now  this  in  sum  involves 
the  astounding  conclusion  that  only  one  hour  after  the  attack  began, 
and  long  before  the  Third  Corps  had  been  forced  back,  General 
Meade  desired  to  retreat,  and  gave  General  Pleasonton  an  order  pre 
liminary  to  doing  so.  It  is  doubly  astounding  from  the  fact  that 
General  Pleasonton  was,  according  to  his  own  account,  absent  for  five 
hours  from  the  field  of  battle,  throughout  the  most  important  part 
of  the  day's  fight,  engaged,  as  he  alleges,  in  the  responsible  duty  of 
preparing  for  retreat.  But  how  comes  it,  then,  that  in  his  official 
report  of  the  campaign,  made  in  August  of  the  same  year,  he  omits 
to  mention  or  to  allude  in  any  way  to  this  incident  of  which  he  has 
now  so  perfect  a  recollection?  And  again,  it  may  naturally  be 
asked,  Why,  when  he  was  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  in  March,  1864,  only  nine  months  after  the  battle,  did  he 
not  in  his  testimony  refer  to  it  in  even  the  most  remote  manner,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  as  will  shortly  appear  upon  his  own  authority,  did, 
in  answer  to  the  question  as  to  whether  he  knew  of  General  Meade's 
ever  having  had  any  idea  of  retreating  from  Gettysburg,  say  that  lie 
did  not  remember.  It  would  seem,  then,  that  when  events  are  recent, 
General  Pleasonton's  recollection  of  them  is  not  so  vivid  as  when  they 
are  long  past;  that,  in  fact,  they  do  not  reach  the  sphere  of  his  con 
sciousness  until  some  years  after  their  occurrence. 

General  Doubleday,  aware  of  the  discrepancies  in  the  testimony  of 
his  witness,  attempts  to  bolster  it  up  by  pointing  out  that  there  is 
further  testimony  of  General  Pleasonton's  before  the  Committee  on 
the  Conduct  of  the  War,  which  has  probably  escaped  notice,  and 
which,  he  would  persuade  us,  is  quite  sufficient  to  bear  out  his  charge. 
Let  us  now  examine  that,  and  see  what  it  amounts  to.  In  the  Reports 


9 

of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  Part  2d  of  the  Supple 
ment,  will  be  found  the  testimony  to  which  General  Doubleday  refers. 
It  is  in  the  form  of  a  long  letter,  dated  Oct.  16th,  1865,  addressed  -to 
the  Committee  by  General  Pleasonton,  who  had  shortly  after  his  first 
testimony  before  the  Committee  been  relieved  from  duty  with  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  giving  a  history  of  his  personal  experiences 
throughout  the  whole  of  the  Rebellion.  The  following  is  an  extract 
from  page  10  of  this  letter,  which  is  General  Pleasonton's  account 
there  of  the  second  day's  battle  at  Gettysburg.  He  says:  — 

"  On  the  2d  of  July,  1863,  that  portion  of  the  army  that  was  on 
"  the  field  was  placed  in  a  defensive  position,  but  General  Meade  had 
u  so  little  assurance  in  his  own  ability  to  maintain  himself,  or  in  the 
"  strength  of  his  position,  that  when  the  rebels  partially  broke  our 
u  line  in  the  afternoon  of  the  2d,  he  directed  me  to  collect  what 
"  cavalry  I  could,  and  prepare  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army;  and 
u  I  was  thus  engaged  until  twelve  o'clock  that  night.  I  mention  this 
"  fact  now,  because  when  I  was  before  your  honorable  Committee,  and 
u  was  asked  the  question  whether  General  Meade  ever  had  any  idea 
"  of  retreating  from  Gettysburg,  I  answered  that  I  did  not  remember, 
"  the  above  circumstance  at  that  time  being  out  of  my  mind,  and  it 
"  was  only  afterwards  recalled  by  my  staff  officers  on  my  return  to 
"camp." 

It  is  thus  seen  that  this  statement  of  General  Pleasonton,  made  a 
little  over  two  years  after  Gettysburg,  differs  entirely  from  that  be 
fore  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  made  nine  months 
after  Gettysburg,  and  very  materially  from  that  made  last  February, 
nearly  twrenty  years  afterward.  In  his  first  statement  (before  the 
Committee)  he  remembered  nothing  about  the  question  of  retreat.  In 
his  second  statement  (in  his  letter  to  the  Committee)  he  says  that  in 
the  emergency,  when  the  enemy  partially  broke  our  line,  General 
Meade  instructed  him  to  take  measures  for  the  contingency  of  retreat. 
But  in  the  third  statement,  nearly  twenty  years  after  Gettysburg,  be 
it  remembered,  the  time  at  which  he  represents  himself  as  having 
received  his  orders  is  long  before  affairs  assumed  a  critical  aspect, 
the  length  of  time  he  was  absent  on  this  alleged  duty  is  shortened  by 
two  hours,  and  the  question  of  contingency  of  retreat  has  been  en 
tirely  discarded.  To  sum  up,  General  Pleasonton,  in  his  official 
report  immediately  after  the  battle,  did  not  consider  this  incident  of 
sufficient  importance  to  mention  it.  In  the  following  year,  when 
before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  he  forgot  it.  Two 
years  after  the  battle  he  gave  it  as  evidence  of  unnecessary  precau 
tion.  Nearly  twenty  years  afterward  he  gives  it  succinctly,  without 
qualification,  as  an  explicit  order  for  a  specific  purpose. 


10 

As  a  possible  explanation  of  these  irreconcilable  statements,  an  in 
cident  of  July  2d,  at  Gettysburg,  connected  with  General  Pleasonton, 
is  here  introduced.  This  incident  is  alluded  to  in  the  official  report 
of  one  of  that  general's  subordinates.  While  it  shows  that  certain 
action  preparatory  to  retreat  was  actually  taken  by  General  Pleasonton 
on  the  afternoon  of  July  2d,  it  also  clearly  shows  how  little  confidence 
he  himself  had  at  that  time  in  our  ability  to  maintain  ourselves, 
"  when,"  as  he  says,  "  the  rebels  partially  broke  our  line  on  the  after 
noon  of  July  2d." 

During  the  campaign  of  Gettysburg,  Captain  J.  M.  Robertson,  Sec 
ond  U.  S.  Artillery  (now  Bvt.  Brig.  Gen.  U.  S.  A.),  was  in  command 
of  the  First  Brigade  of  Horse  Artillery,  attached  to  the  Cavalry  Corps, 
and  therefore  under  the  immediate  orders  of  General  Pleasonton.  In 
that  officer's  official  report  of  the  campaign,  made  on  22d  August, 
1863,  we  find  the  following  statement:  — 

"  Arrived  near  the  battle-ground  of  Gettysburg  at  5.30  A.  M.  on 
"  the  2d,  and  reported  to  the  General  commanding  the  Cavalry  Corps, 
"  and  by  his  directions  held  my  batteries  in  reserve  near  the  battle- 
"  ground  until  near  dark,  when,  by  his  direction,  I  moved  back 
"  about  two  miles  on  the  Baltimore  Pike  and  encamped  for  the  night." 

Hearing  that  some  such  movement  had  taken  place,  but  not  knowing 
by  whose  orders,  I  some  years  ago  wrote  to  General  Robertson  for 
an  account  of  the  movement,  and  under  what  circumstances  it  came 
to  be  made.  In  reply,  he  said  that  on  the  evening  of  the  2il  July, 
just  at  sunset,  he  had  his  reserve  batteries  feeding  in  a  meadow  on 
the  banks  of  Rock  Creek,  when  an  officer  rode  furiously  up  to  him. 
General  Robertson  continues  : — 

"As  soon  as  he  was  near  enough  to  be  heard,  he  said  in  a  very  ex- 
"  cited  manner,  so  that  all  the  men  heard  him  :  i  General  Pleasonton 
"  directs  that  you  at  once  move  your  batteries  across  Stony  [Rock] 
"  Creek,  and  retire  about  one  mile  on  the  Taneytown  road  [Baltimore 
u  Pike]  and  take  up  a  position.  The  Rebs  have  broken  through  our 
"  centre,  and  it  is  all  up  with  us  ! ' 

It  may  be  answered  that  this  mode  of  address  was  simply  that  offi 
cer's,  that  General  Pleasonton  was  in  no  wise  responsible  for  undue 
excitement  in  an  officer's  demeanor  when  carrying  his  order.  Still, 
inasmuch  as  he  had  received  his  order  from  General  Pleasonton,  it  is 
reasonable  to  conclude  that  the  excitement  which  he  betrayed  was 
communicated  to  him  either  by  the  words  or  the  manner  of  his  chief. 
It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  General  Pleasonton,  at  dusk  of  that 
memorable  day,  was  so  far  from  thinking  that  General  Meade  was 


11 

unduly  wanting  in  confidence  as  to  his  ability  to  maintain  his  position 
when  the  enemy  partially  broke  our  line,  that  he  himself  thought  it 
"was  all  up  with  us." 

Thus  it  has  been  shown  that  the  testimony  of  this  witness  upon 
whom  General  Doubleday  has  greatly  relied  to  sustain  his  charge 
against  General  Meade  has  completely  broken  down  under  its  own 
collated  weight,  and  that  the  charge,  so  far  as  this  testimony  is  equal 
to  sustaining  it.  must 'perforce  with  it  fall  to  the  ground. 

Continuing  to  comment  upon  Mr.  Swinton's  statements  regarding 
the  point  which  has  now  been  exhaustively  discussed,  General  Double- 
day  says : — 

"  By  way  of  rebuttal,  Mr.  Swinton  parades  the  following  declara- 
u  tion  of  General  Meade.  A  very  slight  examination  will  show  that 
"  it  refers  to  a  different  period  of  the  battle;  to  the  morning  of  the 
"  2cl,  and  not  to  the  evening.  General  Meade  says  :  '  I  utterly  deny, 
"  under  the  full  solemnity  and  sanctity  of  my  oath,  and  in  the  firm 
"  conviction  that  the  day  will  come  when  the  secrets  of  all  men  shall 
"  be  made  known — I  utterly  deny  having  intended  or  thought  for  one 
"  instant  to  withdraw  that  army,  unless  the  military  contingencies 
"  which  the  future  should  develop  during  the  course  of  the  day  might 
"  render  it  a  matter  of  necessity  that  the  army  should  be  withdrawn.' 
"  The  italics  are  mine." 

This  purports  to  be  a  passage  from  General  Meade's  testimony  be 
fore  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  as  printed  in  the  re 
port  of  the  Committee,  and  also  in  the  appendix  to  Mr.  Swinton's 
"  Campaigns  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac."  And  he  who  pretends  to 
quote  it  is  he  who,  in  a  preceding  clause  of  his  letter,  only  a  few  lines 
back,  speaks  of  himself,  impliedly,  "  as  a  faithful  historian."  The 
italics,  he  says,  are  his  ;  let  that  pass,  although  the  meaning  did  not 
require  them.  The  quotation  is  correct,  of  course,  if  so  relatively 
small  a  matter  as  italicizing  is  noticed.  We  ought  to  feel  doubly 
sure  of  that,  from  the  fact  that  the  letter  under  consideration  is  now 
republished  on  a  sheet  for  special  distribution.  But  is  it  correct? 
No.  General  Meade  said  :  — 

"  1  utterly  deny,  under  the  full  solemnity  and  sanctity  of  my  oath, 
"  .  .  .  I  utterly  deny  ever  having  intended  or  thought,  for  one 
"  instant,  to  withdraw  that  army,  unless  the  military  contingencies 
"  which  the  future  should  develop  during  the  course  of  the  day  might 
"  render  it  a  matter  of  necessity  that  the  army  should  be  withdrawn." 

Proceeding,  General  Meade  added:  — 

"  I  base  this  denial,  not  only  on  my  own  assertion  and  my  own 
"  veracity,  but  I  shall  also  show  to  the  committee,  from  documentary 


12 

"  evidence,  the  despatches  and  orders  issued  by  me  at  different  periods 
"  during  that  day,  that  if  I  did  intend  any  such  operation,  I  was  at 
"  the  same  time  doing  things  totally  inconsistent  with  any  such  inten- 


What  a  reply  to  such  a  clear  and  comprehensive  statement,  when 
his  attention  too  had  been  especially  drawn  to  it,  is  that  of  General 
Doubleday  !  He  omits  the  concluding  passage,  in  which  General 
Meade  said  that  he  would  not  depend  for  sustaining  his  asseveration 
even  upon  his  known  reputation  for  veracity,  but  would  show  that  the 
suspicion  raised  was  incompatible  with  the  events  of  the  day.  He 
evades  the  full  sense  of  General  Meade's  denial  of  "  ever  having  in 
tended,"  garbled  by  the  omission  of  the  indispensable  word  "  ever." 
And  he  coolly  sums  up  the  significance  of  the  statement  by  saying 
that  it  "  refers  to  a  different  period  of  the  battle  ;  to  the  morning 
of  the  2d,  and  not  to  the  evening."  What  a  commentary — his  own — 
is  this  general's  upon  his  faithfulness  as  an  historian ! 

Having  now,  as  cannot  be  doubted  save  by  the  most  careless  reader 
of  the  evidence  adduced,  disposed  of  General  Doubleday's  charge 
that  General  Meade's  actions  on  the  2d  of  July,  as  derived  from  the 
testimony  of  General  Pleasonton,  showed  a  desire  and  intention  in  any 
event  to  retreat ;  having  rectified  the  misquotation  by  General  Double- 
day  of  General  Meade's  asseveration  that  he  never  intended  to  re 
treat,  and  that  his  despatches  and  orders  would  prove  upon  examina 
tion  inconsistent  with  any  such  theory  ;  and  having  shown  by  the  full 
text  of  the  asseveration  that  it  covered  the  whole  period  under  dis 
cussion,  without  reservation  ;  let  us  examine  into  the  merits  of  the  case 
where  General  Doubleday  attempts  to  prove  the  same  charge  against 
General  Meade  through  evidence  which  he  produces  regarding  the 
proceedings  of  a  consultation  of  corps  commanders  held  at  general 
headquarters  on  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July. 

General  Doubleday's  statements  as  to  this  circumstance  are  so 
much  at  variance  with  facts,  arid  the  obscurity  of  his  style  is  so  great, 
that  it  is  not  always  easy  to  follow  him.  Critical  examination,  how 
ever,  of  the  text  of  his  letter  will  fully  bear  out  the  statement  that 
the  meaning  which  he  intends  to  convey  is  that  in  the  night  of  July 
2d,  General  Meade,  still  (according  to  General  Doubleday's  theory) 
impressed  with  the  desirability  of  retreating,  called  his  corps  comman 
ders  together  and  propounded  certain  questions  to  them  looking  to 
retreat. 

The  fact  of  the  calling  a  meeting  of  corps  commanders,  of  their 
coming  together,  of  certain  questions  being  propounded  to  them,  is 


13 

not  denied.  It  is  a  well-known  historical  event.  But  at  the  very  out 
set  of  the  investigation  it  is  to  be  noted  that  General  Doubleday, 
with  his  habitual  inaccuracy,  gives  the  questions  propounded  about  as 
incorrectly  as  it  is  possible  to  record  any  matter  needing  precision  of 
statement.  Yet,  upon  the  knowledge  of  the  character  of  the  ques 
tions,  of  the  answers  to  them,  as  well  as  of  General  Meade's  final  de 
cision  after  hearing  the  answers,  must  depend  the  excellence  or  worth- 
lessness  of  the  judgment  one  can  form  regarding  the  event.  For 
tunately,  there  are  other  records  besides  General  Doubleday's. 

This  incidentally  noted,  let  us  proceed  to  the  statement  as  for 
mulated  in  General  Doubleday's  letter.  It  is,  that  the  decision  of 
the  corps  commanders  was  to  remain  in  the  then  position  of  the  army. 
To  use  General  Doubleday's  own  words :  "  General  Meade  dissented 
from  the  conclusion,  and  expressed  his  strong  dissatisfaction."  Ac 
cording  to  General  Doubleday,  General  Meade  was,  in  fact,  overruled 
by  his  corps  commanders,  and  thus  prevented  from  retreating.  The 
authority  given  for  this  is  General  Butterfield's  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War. 

But  Mr.  Swinton  having  pointed  out  in  his  "  Campaigns  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,"  that  General  Butterfield's  testimony  is  not  confirmed 
by  any  other  officer  present  at  the  council  of  war,  General  Doubleday 
advances  again  to  the  assault,  armed  with  a  letter,  dated  Feb.  19th, 
1883,  from  General  Slocum,  quoted  in  full  in  his  own.  General 
Slocum  says  : — 

"  The  question  submitted  was:  'Is  it  advisable  for  the  army  to  re- 
"  main  in  its  present  position,  or  to  fall  back?'  The  opinion  of  each 
"'corps  commander  was  asked,  commencing  with  the  junior  in  rank. 
"  A  majority  were  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  remain  in  the  posi- 
"  tion  then  held  by  us.  When  each  officer  had  expressed  his  views, 
"  General  Meade  said :  '  Well,  gentlemen,  the  question  is  settled. 
u  We  will  remain  here,  but  I  wish  to  say  that  I  consider  this  no  place 
"  to  fight  a  battle.'  I  do  not  believe  any  officer  who  was  present  at 
"  this  important  meeting  has  forgotten  General  Meade's  words." 

With  all  due  respect  to  General  Slocum,  be  it  said,  he  is  mistaken. 
He  was  most  assuredly  under  a  false  impression  at  the  time  of  the  coun 
cil,  as  to  certain  words  there  spoken,  and  as  to  the  person  who  spoke 
them,  and,  in  the  course  of  years,  has  forgotten  that  any  language,  such 
as  he  describes  as  used  in  the  council,  must  have  referred  to  the  con 
tingency  of  a  successful  flank  movement  by  General  Lee.  Whatever 
the  language,  and  by  whomsoever  used,  it  was  not  indicative  of  a  de 
sire  to  retreat ;  that  is  certain.  The  evidence  is  cumulative  that  no 
such  desire  existed  in  the  breast  of  any  member  of  the  council.  We 


14 

shall  find,  as  we  proceed,  that,  so  far  from  General  Slocum' s  recollec 
tion  being  confirmed,  as  he  imagines,  by  every  officer  present  at  the 
council,  it  is  contradicted  by  the  recollection,  when  the  matter  was 
recent,  of  several  officers  then  present.  Moreover,  it  can  be  impugned 
on  account  of  his  statement  that  the  majority  of  the  officers  present 
decided  to  fight  in  the  position  of  Gettysburg.  The  decision  of  the 
council  was  unanimous. 

If  the  conviction  can  be  brought  home  to  General  Slocum,  that  he 
is  mistaken,  he  will  be  ready  to  acknowledge  his  error.  But,  at  any 
rate,  whether  or  not  he  can  reach  the  conclusion  that  he  was  mistaken 
at  the  time,  or  that  his  recollection  of  the  event  is  now  at  fault,  the 
cause  of  justice  can  no  longer  be  delayed,  if  there  is  aught  in  circum 
stantial  evidence  and  human  testimony  combined  that  avails  to  right 
a  wrong. 

At  the  close  of  the  fighting  on  the  2d  of  July,  General  Meade 
summoned  his  corps  commanders  to  assemble  at  his  headquarters,  in 
order  to  obtain  from  them  information  as  to  the  condition  of  their 
separate  commands,  and  to  confer  with  them  as  to  the  action  to  be 
taken  on  the  following  day.  These  officers  could  not  have  all  assem 
bled  until  9  P.M.,  for  the  fighting  on  General  Howard's  front  con 
tinued  until  that  hour ;  he  was  present  with  his  command  until  the 
fighting  was  over,  and  was  afterwards  at  the  conference.  There  were 
present,  besides  the  commanding  general,  Generals  Slocum,  Sedg- 
wick,  Howard,  Hancock,  Newton,  Sykes,  Birney,  A.  S.  Williams, 
and  Gibbon.  General  Butterfield  was  in  attendance,  in  his  capacity 
of  chief-of-staff ;  General  Pleasonton,  commander  of  the  Cavalry 
Corps,  was  not  present. 

After  a  long  conversation  regarding  the  events  of  the  day,  and  dis 
cussion  of  the  probabilities  as  to  General  Lee's  future  movements, 
and  of  the  most  advisable  action  to  take,  General  Meade  finally  con 
densed  the  points  to  be  decided,  and  submitted  them  in  the  form  of 
the  following  questions  : — * 

QUESTIONS  ASKED. 

1.  "  Under  existing  circumstances,  is  it  advisable  for  this  army  to 
remain  in  its  present  position  or  to  retire  to  another  nearer  its  base 
of  supplies  ?" 

2.  "  It  being  determined  to  remain  in  present  position,  shall  the 
army  attack  or  wait  the  attack  of  the  enemy  ?" 

3.  "If  we  wait  attack,  how  long  ?" 

*  These  questions  and  replies  are  taken  from  the  original  minutes  of  the  Coun 
cil  at  Gettysburg,  of  the  2d  of  July,  1863,  and  are  among  the  papers  of  General 
Meade. 


15 


Gibbon. 

Williams. 

Birney. 

Sykes. 
Newton. 

Howard. 


I. 

.» 

3. 

1. 

2. 
3. 

Hancock.  1. 


Sedgwick. 


Slocum. 


REPLIES. 

.  "  Correct  position  of  the  array,  but  would  not  retreat." 

"In  no  condition  to  attack,  in  his  opinion." 
,   "  until  he  moves." 
,   "•  Till  enemy  moves." 

,   "  Stay." 

"  Wait  attack." 
,   u  One  day." 

"  Same  as  General  Williams." 
Do.  do. 

"  Correct  position  of  the  army,  but  would  not  retreat." 
"  By  all  means  not  attack." 

"  If  we  wait,  it  will  give   them  a  chance  to  cut  our 
line." 

"  Remain." 

"  Wait  attack  until  4  P.M.  to-morrow." 

"  If  don't  attack,  attack  them." 

"  Rectify  position  without   moving  so   as  to  give  up 

field." 

"  Not  attack  unless  our  communications  are  cut." 
u  Can't  wait  long;  can't  be  idle." 

"  Remain" 

u  and  wait  attack" 

"at  least  one  day." 

"  Stay  and  fight  it  out." 


It  certainly  should  be  demonstrable,  even  without  adducing  any 
direct  evidence,  that  the  possibility  of  a  flank  movement  by  General 
Lee,  threatening  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  army,  and  if  suc 
cessful  in  cutting  them  with  a  large  force,  entailing  the  taking  up  of 
a  new  position,  ought  to  have  been,  and  wTas  discussed,  in  the  council 
of  war.  We  now  know,  since  the  close  of  the  war,  through  General 
Longstreet,  that  the  plan  of  attempting  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  proposed  and  strongly  advocated  by  him 
to  General  Lee.  General  Meade's  first  quoted  despatch  to  Gene 
ral  Halleck  explicitly  states  it  as  a  contingency ;  his  testimony  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  shortly  to  be  quoted,  also 
explicitly  states  it  as  a  contingency:  for  which,  as  in  the  case  of 
any  contingency,  it  is  a  duty  to  prepare.  It  would  be  incredible 


16 

that  a  contingency  which  every  tyro  in  the  art  of  war  sees  involved 
in  strategy,  especially  where  the  safety  of  a  capital  is  concerned, 
should  not  have  been  considered  by  veterans.  The  propriety,  nay, 
the  necessity,  for  the  consideration  of  this  question  is  so  obvious  that 
it  seems  puerile  to  discuss  it.  The  fact  that  it  was  considered  is 
plainly  in  evidence,  not  only  from  direct  testimony,  but  from  the  mere 
wording  of  the  first  question :  "  Under  existing  circumstances,  is  it 
advisable  for  this  army  to  remain  in  its  present  position,  or  to  retire 
to  another  nearer  its  base  of  supplies  ?"  Here  is  no  suggestion  of  re 
treat,  but  merely  of  strategical  movement.  The  questions,  too,  let  it 
be  remembered,  were  propounded  after  the  discussion,  and  must 
represent  the  extreme  range  of  divergence  of  opinion  that  had  been 
recognized  through  that  process  ;  and  through  the  general  tenor  of 
the  answers  to  them  is  very  plainly  to  be  seen  that  the  range  of  diver 
gence  never  had  reached  for  one  of  its  extremes  the  possibility  of  re 
treat,  but  merely  of  retiring  to  a  better  position  in  the  given  contin 
gency  ;  and  that  there  was  ample  confidence  among  the  officers  as  to 
the  ability  of  the  army  in  its  position  at  that  time  to  hold  its  own 
against  any  direct  attack  of  the  enemy,  for  we  find  them  unanimous 
in  their  opinion  as  to  the  advisability  of  remaining  in  the  position  then 
held. 

There  is,  it  will  be  observed,  nothing,  either  in  the  character  of  the 
questions  or  in  that  of  the  replies,  that  would  warrant  one  in  suppos 
ing  that  the  Commanding  General,  or  any  one  else,  favored  retreating. 
And,  if  one  be  called  upon  to  believe  that,  without  expressing  or  im 
plying  the  fact  in  his  formal  questions,  the  Commanding  General  did 
favor  it, — a  circumstance  that  could  not  have  failed  to  be  known 
through  the  previous  discussion, — it  is  strange  that  this  fact  is  not 
indicated  in  the  agreement  with  his  opinion  of  a  single  one  of  the 
replies  of  the  corps  commanders,  some  of  whom  had  the  greatest  re 
spect  for  and  reliance  upon  his  judgment. 

It  was  never  dreamed  of  by  General  Meade,  or  by  those  about  him 
who  were  not  hostile  to  him  from  the  moment  he  took  command,  that 
such  construction  as  that  indicated  could  be  put  upon  anything  which 
had  taken  place  at  the  council.  As  far  as  known  to  them,  no  question 
upon  the  subject  was  raised  until  nine  months  after  the  battle,  when 
the  allegation  appeared  in  the  newspapers  as  one  of  the  charges 
made  against  General  Meade  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct 
of  the  War.  General  Meade  being  himself  before  the  Committee 
at  the  time  when  his  attention  was  attracted  to  the  published  state 
ments  of  some  of  the  testimony  regarding  the  council  of  war  of  the  2d 


17 

of  July,  made  the  following  statement  to  the  Committee,  to  be  found 
in  the  printed  reports: — 

"  Having  thus  denied  any  recollection  of  having  issued,  or  directed 
"  to  be  issued,  any  order  on  the  morning  of  the  2d  of  July  for  the 
"  retreat  of  my  army  before  any  attack  from  the  enemy,  I  now  desire 
"  to  refer  to  a  consultation  of  my  corps  commanders  held  on  that  even- 
"  ing,  which,  it  has  occurred  to  me,  may  possibly  be  the  groundwork 
"  for  this  report  that  I  had  directed  an  order  to  retreat. 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  July,  after  the  battle  of  that  day 
"  had  ceased,  and  darkness  had  set  in,  being  aware  of  the  very  heavy 
"  losses  of  the  First  and  Eleventh  Corps  on  the  1st  of  July,  and  know- 
"  ing  how  severely  the  Third  Corps,  the  Fifth  Corps,  and  other  por- 
"  tions  of  the  army  had  suffered  in  the  battle  of  the  2d  of  July — in 
a  fact,  as  subsequently  ascertained,  out  of  the  24,000  men  killed, 
"  wounded,  and  missing,  which  was  the  amount  of  my  losses  and 
"  casualties  at  Gettysburg',  over  20,000  of  them  had  been  put  hors 
"  da  combat  before  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July;  and  taking  into  con- 
"  sideration  the  number  of  stragglers,  and  weakening  of  my  army 
"  from  the  two  days'  battle,  my  ignorance  of  the  condition  of  the 
"  corps,  and  the  moral  condition  of  the  troops,  caused  me  to  send  for 
"  my  corps  commanders  to  obtain  from  them  the  exact  condition  of 
"  affairs  in  their  separate  commands,  and  to  consult  and  advise  with 
u  them  as  to  what,  if  anything,  should  be  done  on  the  morrow.  The 
"  strong  attack  of  the  enemy  that  day  upon  my  left  flank,  and  their 
"  persistent  efforts  to  obtain  possession  of  what  is  called  Round  Top 
"  Mountain,  induced  the  supposition  that  possibly,  on  the  next  dav, 
"  a  very  persistent  attack  might  be  made,  or  that  a  movement, 
"  upon  their  part,  to  my  left  and  rear  might  be  made  to  occupy  the 
"  lines  of  communication  I  then  held  with  the  Taneytown  Road  and 
u  the  Baltimore  Pike. 

"  The  questions  discussed  by  this  council  were,  first,  whether  it 
u  was  necessary  for  us  to  assume  any  different  position  from  what  we 
"then  held;  and  secondly,  whether,  if  we  continued  to  maintain  the 
"  position  we  then  held,  our  operations  the  next  day  should  be  offen- 
"  sive  or  defensive.  The  opinion  of  the  council  was  unanimous,  which 
"  agreed  fully  with  my  own  views,  that  we  should  maintain  our  lines 
"  as  they  were  then  held,  and  that  we  should  wait  the  movements 
u  of  the  enemy  and  see  whether  he  made  any  further  attack  before 
"  we  assumed  the  offensive.  I  felt  satisfied  that  the  enemy  would 
"  attack  again,  as  subsequently  proved  to  be  the  case,  for  he  made  a 
"  vigorous  assault  upon  my  right  flank,  which  lasted  from  daylight  in 
"  the  morning  until  ten  o'clock.  He  then  made  one  of  his  heaviest 
"  assaults  upon  my  left  and  left  centre,  which  lasted  from  one  o'clock 
"  until  six  in  the  evening." 

"  I  have  been  specific  in  giving  the  details  of  this  council,  because 
"  it  has  occurred  to  me  as  possible  that  some  erroneous  report  of  what 
"  took  place  there  may  have  given  rise  to  the  idea  that  I  desired  to 
"  withdraw  my  army  and  retreat,  and  that  I  called  my  corps  com- 
"  manders  together  to  know  if  they  were  in  favor  of  retreating." 
2 


18 

"  I  should  like  to  have  the  Committee,  and  I  trust  they  will  do  so, 
"  call  upon  all  the  principal  officers  I  had  upon  that  field — the  corps 
"commanders  and  division  commanders;  that  their  attention  should 
"  be  called  to  all  the  points  to  which  I  have  alluded  here ;  and  that 
"  they  should  be  specifically  questioned  as  to  their  recollection  and 
"  views  upon  those  points." 

Here  is  the  issue  distinctly  marked  out  in  the  statement  of  General 
Meade — "  The  opinion  of  the  council  was  unanimous,  wliicli  agreed 
"fully  with  my  own  views,  that  we  should  maintain  our  lines  as  they 
"were  then  held" — as  contrasted  with  that  of  General  Doubleday, 
which  is  as  follows: — 

"  On  the  evening  of  the  2d,  after  sending  Pleasonton  off,  General 
"  Meade  called  a  council  of  war  and  put  the  question  to  the  corps  com- 
"  manders  whether  they  were  in  favor  of  remaining  on  the  ridge  or 
"  retreating.  Our  losses  had  been  heavy  and  the  enemy  were  then 
"  attacking  our  right,  which  was  denuded  of  troops.  Nevertheless,  the 
"council  voted  to  remain  and  endeavor  to  hold  the  ridge.  G-eneral 
"  Meade  dissented  from  the  conclusion  and  expressed  his  strong  dis- 
"  satisfaction" 

It  remains  now  to  summon  witnesses  on  General  Meade's  side, 
whose  competency  cannot  be  denied  even  by  General  Doubleday,  as 
it  rests  upon  the  same  foundation  of  excellence  affirmed  by  him  of 
General  Slocum's  testimony  quoted  by  him  —  presence  at  the  coun 
cil  of  war. 

General  Meade,  determined  to  put  at  rest  the  injurious  statements 
made  and  published  regarding  his  intention  of  retreating  from  Gettys 
burg,  addressed  the  following  circular  letter  to  Generals  Slocum, 
Sedgwick,  Sykes,  Newton,  A.  S.  Williams,  and  Gibbon. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  POTOMAC, 
March  10th,  1S64. 

CIRCULAR. 

SIR:  Your  attention  is  respectfully  invited  to  the  articles,  which 
have  recently  appeared  in  the  newspapers,  charging  the  Commanding 
General  with  favoring  a  retreat  of  the  army  from  Gettysburg  on  the 
2d  July  last. 

These  articles  are  supposed  to  be  based  upon  the  transactions  of  a 
council,  or  meeting  of  corps  commanders,  held  on  the  evening  of  the 
2d  July ;  and,  if  you  have  no  objection  to  so  doing,  the  Command 
ing  General  desires  that  you  will  furnish  him  in  the  course  of  to-day 
with  a  short  statement,  giving  your  recollection  of  what  transpired 
at  the  council,  and  mentioning  whether  he  at  any  time  insisted  on  the 
withdrawal  of  the  army  from  before  Gettysburg. 

By  Command  of  MAJ.-GEN.  MEADE, 

S.  WILLIAMS, 

Assist.  Adjt. -General. 


19 

This  letter,  marked  as  addressed  among  the  rest  to  General  Slocum, 
who  was  at  that  time  in  the  West,  under  General  Sherman,  was  never 
received  by  him.  The  following  are  the  replies  of  the  other  officers 
addressed:  — 

BRIG.-GEST.  S.  WILLIAMS,  HEADQUARTERS  SIXTH  CORPS, 

Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.  March  10th,  1804. 

GENERAL  :  My  attention  has  been  called  to  several  articles  which 
have  recently  appeared  in  the  papers  insinuating  or  charging  the 
general  commanding  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  with  ordering  or 
favoring  a  retreat  of  the  army  on  the  evening  of  July  2d  at  Gettys 
burg. 

I  took  no  minutes  of  the  council  of  corps  commanders  held  on  the 
evening  of  that  day,  but  my  present  recollection  is  that  three  questions, 
viz.,  of  attacking  the  enemy,  of  sustaining  an  attack,  or  taking  up  a 
new  position,  were  submitted.  The  council  was  unanimous  (with,  I 
think,  one  exception)  to  sustain  the  attack  in  our  then  present  posi 
tion. 

At  no  time  in  my  presence  did  the  General  Commanding  insist  or 
advise  a  withdrawal  of  the  army,  for  such  advice  would  have  great 
weight  with  me  and  I  know  the  matter  did  not  engage  my  serious 
attention. 

I  am  positive  that  the  General  Commanding  could  not  have  insisted, 
much  less  have  given  the  order  to  withdraw  the  army  from  its  posi 
tion.  In  a  council  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  [4th]  the  two  questions 
of  following  the  enemy  or  moving  on  parallel:  lines  were  submitted, 
and,  I  think,  the  council  were  unanimous,  and  their  decision  adopted 
by  the  General  of  moving  parallel  to  the  enemy  and  attacking  him 
when  possible. 

I  am  very  respectfully, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  SEDGWICK, 

Maj.-Gen.  Commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  ARMY  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 
March  10th,  1864. 

GENERAL : 

Your  circular  note  of  this  date  in  relation  to  reports,  to  the  effect 
that  the  Commanding  General  advocated  a  retreat  of  the  army  on  the 
second  day  of  July  last,  and  particularly  in  reference  to  the  proceed 
ings  of  a  council  of  war,  held  on  the  night  of  the  second,  has  been 
received. 

In  reply  I  have  to  state,  that  I  was  frequently  with  the  Commanding 
General  on  that  day,  and  was  likewise  present  at  the  council,  and 
nothing  that  I  heard  him  say,  has  ever  given  me  the  impression  that 
he  insisted  on  the  withdrawal  of  the  army  from  before  Gettysburg. 

There  was  a  discussion  in  the  council  not  concerning  a  retreat,  but 
concerning  the  dispositions  proper  to  make  should  the  enemy  endeavor 
to  turn  our  position,  by  getting  between  us  and  Emmettsburg,  by  pass- 


20 

ing  entirely  around  our  left  flank — and  I  imagine  this  to  have  been 
the  exclusive  foundation  of  such  report  to  the  prejudice  of  the  Com 
manding  General. 

Respectfully  your  most  obt.  servt., 

JOHN  NEWTON, 

BRIG. -GEN.  S.  WILLIAMS,  A.A.G.,  Major-Gen.  Comdg. 

Heaclqrs.  A.  of  P. 

HEADQUARTERS  FIFTH  CORPS  A.  P., 
March  10th,  1864. 

GENERAL : 

I  have  seen  in  late  papers,  and  in  the  speech  of  a  member  of  the 
U.  S.  Senate,  statements  charging  you  with  having  ordered  a  retreat 
of  the  army  at  the  battle  of  Gettysburg. 

I  commanded  a  corps  in  that  battle — was  present  at  a  meeting  on 
the  nights  of  the  second  and  third  [4th]  of  July  when  yourself  and  corps 
commanders  discussed  the  events  then  taking  place — remember  dis 
tinctly  the  number  of  soldiers  we  thought  we  could  take  into  action 
after  the  fight  on  the  second — remember  more  distinctly  the  expressed 
determination  of  each  commander  present  to  fight  that  battle  out  then 
and  there,  and  never  received  or  heard  of  any  order  directing  a  retreat 
of  the  army.  I  am,  General,  very  respectfully, 

your  obt.  servant, 

GEO.  SYKES, 

Major-Gen.  Commclg.  Fifth  Corps. 
MAJ.-GEN.  MEADE,  Comdg.  A.  P. 


HEADQUARTERS,  IST  DIVISION,  12™  CORPS,  ARMY  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 
Tullahoma,  Tenu.,  March  23d,  1864. 

GENERAL : 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  circular  com 
munication  of  tenth  instant. 

My  recollections  of  the  council  or  meeting  of  corps  commanders 
held  on  the  evening  of  2d  July  last  are  briefly  these  : 

After  some  desultory  conversation  having  reference,  mainly,  to  the 
amount  of  supplies  and  the  strength  of  each  corps,  and,  incidentally, 
to  the  results  of  the  afternoon's  attack  upon  our  left  and  to  the  de 
fensible  character  of  the  position  around  Gettysburg  compared  with 
others  named — three  questions  were  read  by  the  Chief  of  Staff  for 
the  opinion  of  the  general  officers  present.  In  substance  they  were, 
1st.  Shall  the  army  remain  in  its  present  position?  2d.  If  so,  how 
long  ?  3d.  Shall  it  act  on  the  defensive  or  offensive  ?  The  vote 
was  (I  think  unanimous)  to  remain  and  to  act  on  the  defensive  and 
the  Commanding  General  announced  that  his  orders  would  be  in  ac 
cordance  with  this  opinion. 

I  heard  no  expression  from  him  which  led  me  to  think  he  was  in 
favor  of  withdrawing  the  army  from  before  Gettysburg. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  General,  very  respectfully, 
your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  WILLIAMS, 

BRIG. -GENERAL  S.  WILLIAMS,  Brig. -Gen.  of  Vols. 

Asst.  Adj. -General  Army  of  the  Potomac. 


21 


HEADQUARTERS  RENDEZVOUS  FOR  DRAFTED  MEN, 

I'HILADELPHIA,  PA.,  March  14th,  18G4. 

ERIC,. -GEN.  S.  WILLIAMS,  Adjt.-Gen.  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

General :  i  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  jour  cir 
cular  of  the  10th  inst.  in  regard  to  the  council  of  war  held  at  General 
Meade's  headquarters  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  of  July  last,  arid  in 
reply  to  state: 

1st.  I  was  a  member  of  that  council,  having  been  placed  by  General 
Hancock  in  command  of  the  Second  Corps,  when  he  was  detached  to 
take  command  of  the  Third  Corps,  after  its  defeat  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  2d. 

2d.  The  result  of  the  day's  fight  was  then,  I  believe,  for  the  first 
time  fully  known.  It,  together  with  our  military  situation,  were  fully 
discussed  and  commented  upon  by  the  members.  It  thus  appeared 
that  the  Third  Corps  had  been  badly  defeated,  and  rendered  for  the 
time  comparatively  useless  ;  that  the  enemy  taking  advantage  of  the 
absence  of  a  portion  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  sent  over  to  the  assistance 
of  our  left  centre  after  the  defeat  of  the  Third  Corps,  had  obtained 
a  footing  in  a  portion  of  our  line  on  the  right,  and  that  to  the  right 
of  Cemetery  Hill  he  had  driven  a  portion  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  out 
of  the  line,  taken  possession  of  some  of  our  batteries  there,  and  had 
been  himself  driven  out  by  the  timely  arrival  of  Carroll's  Brigade, 
sent  by  me  according  to  General  Hancock's  direction,  over  to  the 
right  u  to  the  sound  of  the  firing."  Otherwise  our  line  remained 
intact. 

od.  One  of  the  corps  commanders  (Newton)  urged  some  objections 
against  the  military  position  of  our  line  and  when  the  council  came 
to  decide  upon  a  number  of  points,  which  were  written  out  by  General 
Butterfield,  Chief  of  Staff,  and  submitted  to  its  vote,  one  of  the  ques 
tions  was  to  this  effect:  "Should  the  army  remain  in  its  present 
position  or  retire  to  a  better  one?"  Being  the  youngest  member  of 
the  council  I  was  required  to  vote  first,  and  on  this  particular  point, 
I  voted  (having  General  Newton's  objection  in  my  mind,  and  having 
confidence  in  his  judgment  as  a  military  engineer)  that  we  should  as 
far  as  possible  correct  our  position,  but  on  no  account  to  change  it  so 
much  that  any  one  could  construe  it  into  a  retreat.  My  recollection 
is  that  General  Newton  voted  substantially  the  same  way,  and  that 
every  other  member  voted  simply  to  remain  and  offer  battle.  So  that 
the  decision  of  the  council  to  remain  in  position  was  unanimous. 

4th.  I  never  heard  General  Meade  say  one  word  in  favor  of  a 
retreat,  nor  do  I  believe  that  he  did  so,  being  confident  I  should  have 
\Jiear d^\  it,  the  council  meeting  in  a  room  not  to  exceed  ten  feet 
square.  I  recollect  there  was  great  good  feeling  amongst  the  corps 
commanders  at  their  agreeing  so  unanimously  and  General  Meade's 
announcement  in  a  decided  manner,  "  Such,  then,  is  the  decision." 
There  were  a  number  of  other  questions,  of  minor  importance,  put 
and  decided,  which  I  do  not  deem  it  necessary  to  refer  to. 

It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  state  that  during  a  portion  of 
the  sitting  of  the  council,  which  continued  up  to  nearly  twelve  o'clock, 


22 

fighting  was  going  on  on  the  right  of  our  line,  where  the  portion  of 
the  Twelfth  Corps,  returning  to  its  position  from  the  left  centre,  was 
attempting  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  footing  he  had  gained  in 
our  line. 

I  am,  General,  very  respect'ly,  your  obt.  servt., 

JOHN  GIBBOX, 
Brig.-Gen.  Vols.  Commclg. 

It  is  thus  seen  that,  besides  the  General  Commanding,  five  out 
of  the  ten  other  officers  present  at  the  council  of  war  on  the  2d  of  July 
answered  the  circular  adversely  to  the  charge  made  against  General 
Meade.  Why  the  circular  was  not  sent  to  General  Birney  is  evident 
from  the  circumstance  that,  at  the  time  of  its  transmission  to  others, 
General  Meade,  having  learned  that  General  Birney's  testimony  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  had  reflected  upon  him, 
addressed  a  letter  to  him  individually,  asking  for  an  account  of  it,  with 
which  account  General  Birney,  replying  that  his  testimony  belonged 
to  the  Committee,  declined  to  furnish  him.  Why  the  circular  was  not 
sent  to  Generals  Howard  and  Hancock  is  unknown.  To  correct  the 
popular  presumption  that  all  the  officers  at  the  council  of  war  on  the 
2d  of  July  were  summoned  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of 
the  War,  it  is  well  incidentally  to  mention  that  of  the  eleven  present, 
inclusive  of  the  commanding  general,  only  General  Meade,  and 
Generals  Sedgwick,  Hancock,  Birney,  Gibbon,  and  Butterfield  were 
before  that  Committee. 

While  General  Birney's  testimony  before  the  Committee  cannot  be 
construed  as  in  the  main  favorable  to  the  commanding  general,  there 
is  nothing  in  it  that  supports  the  particular  charge  of  desire  to 
retreat.  He  says  :  — 

"  There  was  a  council  of  the  corps  commanders  held  at  General 
"Meade' s  headquarters  that  night  [July  2d],  of  which  I  was  one  pre- 
"  sent.  It  was  there  determined  to  remain  and  fight  the  next  day  ; 
"to  make  no  attack  the  next  day,  but  to  receive  one  should  the  enemy 
"  make  it. 

"  General  Meade  said  that  his  orders  were  to  cover  Baltimore  and 
"  Washington,  and  he  seemed  indisposed  to  hazard  a  battle  except  on 
"  the  most  favorable  terms." 

Further  on  in  his  testimony,  in  answer  to  the  direct  question,  "  Do 
you  recollect  how  General  Meade  stood  on  that  question  ?"  [as  to  a 
change  of  position  by  retiring],  General  Birney  replied  :  — 

"  General  Meade  stated  that  his  orders  were  positively  to  cover 
"  Washington  and  Baltimore,  and  that  he  did  not  wish  to  hazard  a 
"  battle  without  he  was  certain  of  victory  ;  that  was  his  statement  to 
"  the  council.  He  said  that  he  intended  to  be  guided  by  the  opinions 
"  of  his  corps  commanders." 


23 

Thereupon,  being  asked  whether  the  council  might  not  have  under- 
stood  General  Meade  "  to  be  rather  of  the  opinion  that  it  was  safest 
to  retire,"  General  Birney  answered  merely,  "  I  could  only  state  my 
own  impression.  I  have  given  his  language  as  I  remember  it." 

The  reader  has  now  substantially  before  him,  either  through  testi 
mony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  or  through 
letters,  the  statements  of  the  Commanding  General  and  of  all  the  offi 
cers  present  at  the  council  of  war  on  the  2d  of  July,  excepting  Gene 
rals  Hancock,  Howard,  and  Butterfield,  present  as  chief-of-staff.  It 
remains,  then,  only  to  consider  the  attitude  of  Generals  Hancock  and 
Howard  with  reference  to  the  question  under  discussion.  General  Slo- 
cum  not  only  places  himself  on  record  through  his  letter,  already 
quoted  from,  to  General  Doubleday,  but  his  letter  is  corroborative 
of  General  Butterfield's  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Con 
duct  of  the  War. 

General  Hancock  said  in  the  only  part  of  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee,  relevant  to  the  present  issue  :  — 

"  That  night  [July  2d]  this  council  was  held.  After  each  corps 
"  commander  had  reported  the  actual  condition  of  things  along  his 
u  front,  the  question  was  submitted  to  the  council.  General  Meade 
u  being  present,  and  General  Butterfield  questioning  the  members 
"  whether  we  should  remain  there  or  the  army  fall  back  to  a  better 
"  position, — I  understood  with  a  view  of  protecting  our  supplies, — one 
"  corps  commander,  I  think  it  was  General  Newton,  said  he  did  not 
44  think  the  position  of  Gettysburg  a  very  good  one.  General  Gibbon, 
"  who  Avas  the  junior  officer,  I  believe,  arid  voted  first,  said  that  he 
"  had  not  seen  the  entire  ground,  but  he  had  great  confidence  in 
"  General  Newton's  military  eye  for  these  matters,  and  he  voted  in 
"  accordance  with  that  view  of  the  case,  except  that  he  objected  to 
"  anything  that  looked  like  a  retreat.  I  understood  afterwards  that 
u  General  Newton  really  had  the  same  viewT,  and  did  not  propose  to 
"  make  a  retreat.  But  all  the  other  commanders,  I  understood,  said 
u  they  wished  to  fight  the  battle  there,  and  General  Meade  announced 
u  that  to  be  the  decision.  The  council  then  adjourned,  and  that  was 
"  the  last  operation  of  the  second  day  of  the  fight." 

This  testimony  of  General  Hancock's  being  only  negative  as  to  the 
question  at  issue,  I  took  the  liberty,  on  April  27th  last,  of  addressing 
him  a  letter  covering  specifically  the  points  in  General  Doubleday's 
communication  to  the  "New  York  Times."  In  his  reply,  through  an 
officer  of  his  staff,  on  April  30th,  he  regards  his  statement  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  made  when  the  whole  matter 
was  fresh  and  distinct  in  his  mind,  as  covering  every  point  as  far  as 
he  is  concerned.  Testimony,  therefore,  which  up  to  that  time  was 


24 

negative,  becomes  in  its  nature  positive,  to  the  effect  that  he  has 
nothing  further  to  offer.  What  he  had  to  offer  has  just  been  quoted. 
General  Howard,  who,  as  has  been  mentioned,  was  not  before  the 
Committee,  and  to  whom  the  circular  of  General  Meacle  was  not  sent, 
still  remains.  To  him  also  I  addressed  a  letter  at  the  same  time, 
covering  the  points  in  General  Doubleday's  letter,  and  have  received 
from  him  the  following  reply  :  — 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OP  THE  PLATTE, 

OMAIIA,  NEB.,  June  9th,  1883. 

Colonel  GEORGE  MEADE,  309  Walnut  Street,  Phila. 

MY  DEAII  SIR  : 

I  will  set  down  the  impressions  left  on  my  mind  by  the  council 
during  the  night  of  the  2d  of  July.  A  question  was  submitted  to  us, 
substantially  as  to  whether  we  should  continue  in  the  position  then 
occupied  by  the  army  or  withdraw  to  another.  Your  father  stated 
to  us  clearly  the  existing  condition  of  affairs,  and  General  Butterfield, 
who  was  then  chief -of-staff,  read  the  question.  It  was  quite  freely 
discussed.  One  officer,  a  corps  commander,  said  that,  strategically, 
the  position  was  not  a  good  one.  Some  one  said,  "  Why  so  ?"  The 
officer  answered,  "  Because  Lee  could  so  easily  turn  the  position  if  he 
chose."  I  did  not  hear  your  father  utter  a  word  which  made  me 
think  that  he  then  favored  a  withdrawal  of  his  troops.  Every  officer 
either  urged  the  remaining  or  believed  it  too  late  to  take  up  new 
ground.  Certainly  when  your  father  announced  the  decision,  which 
he  did  after  a  formal  vote,  he  expressed  no  dissatisfaction  or  dissent 
from  our  opinions.  With  sincere  regard  for  your  excellent  father's 
memory,  official  and  personal,  and  pleasant  recollections  of  yourself, 
I  remain 

Yours  truly, 

OLIVER  0.  HOWARD, 

Brigadier  General  U.  S.  A. 

We  have  now  before  us  the  testimony  of  every  officer  present  at 
the  council  of  war  of  July  2d,  and  excepting  that  of  Generals  Slocum 
and  Butterfield,  it  is  adverse  to  the  charge  of  General  Doubleday. 
The  testimony  of  General  Meade  and  of  General  Hancock  is 
printed  in  the  reports  of  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War ; 
the  letters,  already  introduced,  of  Generals  Sedgwick,  Newton, 
Sykes,  A.  S.  Williams,  and  Gibbon,  in  reply  to  General  Meade's  cir 
cular  letter,  are,  and  have  been  for  years,  on  file  in  the  War  Depart 
ment,  where  of  course  General  Doubleday,  "  as  a  faithful  historian," 
has  had  access  to  them,  and  in  his  researches  has  consulted  these 


25 

authoritative  records,  and  yet  he  not  only  does  not  accept  them,  but 
does  not  even  mention  their  existence. 

General  Warren,  writing  to  me  some  years  ago  upon  the  subject 
of  this  council,  said  :  — 

"  I  know  General  Meade  had  made  up  his  mind  to  hold  his  ground 
"  to  the  last  minute,  without  any  idea  of  retreating,  and  if  such  ques- 
"  tiori  was  then  considered,  the  decision  was  made  beforehand." 

It  is  to  be  gathered  from  the  letter  of  General  Gibbon,  that  the 
council  was  in  session  until  nearly  midnight,  and  that  it  broke  up 
immediately  after  coming  to  a  decision.  As  at  11  P.  M.,  July  2d, 
General  Meade  sent  the  following  despatch  to  General  Halleck,  that 
is,  an  hour  before  the  council  terminated,  it  is  fair  to  presume  what 
General  Meade' s  intentions  were  before  the  decision  of  the  corps 
commanders  had  been  reached. 

HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC, 

July  2,  IStiS,  11  P.  M. 

GENERAL  HALLECK  :  The  enemy  attacked  me  about  4  P.  M.  this 
day,  and,  after  one  of  the  severest  contests  of  the  war,  was  repulsed 
at  all  points.  We  have  suffered  considerably  in  killed  and  wounded  ; 
among  the  former  are  Brigadier-General  Paul  Zook  ;  and  among  the 
wounded,  Generals  Sickles,  Barlow,  Graham;  and  Warren,  slightly. 
We  have  taken  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  I  shall  remain  in  my 
present  position  to-morrow,  but  am  not  prepared  to  say,  until  better 
advised  of  the  condition  of  the  army,  whether  my  operations  will  be 

of  an  offensive  or  defensive  character. 

• 

GEORGE  G.  MEADE, 

Major  General. 

If  any  testimony  be  demanded,  additional  to  that  which  now  seems 
conclusive  against  the  charge  that  General  Meade  intended  to  retreat, 
it  will  only  be  necessary  to  refer  to  that  of  General  Hunt,  Chief  of 
Artillery,  General  Warren,  Chief  Engineer,  and  General  Seth  Wil 
liams,  Adjutant-General,  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  given  before 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War.  It  shows  that  they  never 
understood  from  General  Meade  that  he  had  any  desire  or  intention 
to  retreat  from  Gettysburg.  True,  they  were  not  present  at  the  con 
ference  on  the  night  of  July  2d,  and  also,  their  testimony  is  negative ; 
but  if  it  be  considered  how  high  and  important  their  positions  in  that 
army  were,  that  all  of  them,  from  the  necessity  of  their  positions, 
were  near  the  person  of  the  Commanding  General,  and  that  in  all  he 
had  the  greatest  confidence,  and  possessed  for  them  the  highest  es 
teem,  it  ought  to  be  apparent  that  he  would  hardly,  indeed  could 


26 

hardly,  conceal  from  them,  even  if  he  wished,  his  desire  or  intention 
concerning  so  momentous  an  operation  as  a  retreat  of  the  army.  The 
confidence  that  General  Meade  had  in  General  Hunt  is  incidentally 
shown  in  his  testimony  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the 
War,  and  that  which  he  had  for  the  others,  by  his  having  invited 
them  successively  on  June  28th,  as  soon  as  he  had  taken  command  of 
the  army,  to  assume  temporarily,  in  addition  to  their  own  respective 
duties,  those  of  chief-of-staff.  General  Meade  intended  that  General 
Humphreys  should  eventually  fill  this  position,  and  had  so  notified 
him,  but  he  concluded  that  it  was  for  the  best  interests  of  the  service 
that  General  Humphreys  should  continue  during  the  emergency  in 
command  of  his  division  in  the  Third  Corps,  as  he  relied  greatly  on 
him  as  a  main  dependence  in  the  handling  of  that  corps  during  the 
impending  battle.  This  decision  was  also  in  keeping  with  General 
Humphreys'  own  wishes. 

It  was  solely  owing  to  the  decision  in  the  case  of  General  Hum 
phreys,  and  to  the  disinclination  of  Generals  Warren  and  Seth  Williams 
to  accept  the  position,  through  their  belief  that  in  the  emergency  they 
could  render  better  service  in  the  positions  which  they  respectively 
held,  that  induced  General  Meade  to  come  to  the  conclusion  to  retain 
General  Butterfield,  General  Hooker's  chief-of-staff,  temporarily  in 
the  same  position,  in  consideration  of  the  fact  that  he  was  more 
familiar  at  that  time  than  any  one  else  could  be  with  the  personnel 
of  the  army  and  the  routine  of  the  office.  If  any  one  of  the  three 
officers  mentioned,  General  Humphreys,  General  Warren,  and  Gene 
ral  Williams,  had  been  chief-of-staff  on  the  eventful  day  of  the  2d  of 
July,  at  Gettysburg,  the  nation  would  not  have  witnessed  nine  months 
afterward  the  humiliating  spectacle  of  its  victorious  general,  who  had 
received  the  thanks  of  the  Government  and  of  the  people,  compelled 
to  defend  himself  from  the  aspersion  of  having  intended  to  retreat 
from  the  field  he  won. 

If  anything  be  wanting  beyond  what  has  been  said  to  enable  one 
to  form  an  estimate  of  General  Doubleday's  fitness  for  the  task  of  an 
historian,  it  is  only  necessary  to  consider  in  connection  with  his  book 
the  concluding  paragraph  of  his  late  letter,  which  letter  was  written 
to  justify  the  statements  of  his  book.  There,  for  the  first  time,  he 
freely  admits,  he  says,  that  in  what  he  is  pleased  to  style  his  criticism 
of  General  Meade  before  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War, 
he  was  "unnecessarily  harsh"  in  his  language.  He  accounts  for  it 
by  saying  that,  "just  before  the  battle  of  Gettysburg,"  he  thought 


27 

he  had  reason  to  believe  that  General  Meade  was  about  to  convert  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  into  a  "partisan  force,  which  was  to  become 
the  personal  appanage  of  an  individual."  Naturally  he  resented 
that,  but  found  out  afterwards  that  he  was  "  mistaken  in  this  respect ; 
"  that  he  had  no  intention  of  reorganizing  the  army  in  the  interest  of 
"  General  McClellan.  Indeed,  he  could  not  have  done  so  without 
"  displacing  himself.  When  I  understood  the  circumstances  I  did 
:'  not  blame  him  for  his  action  toward  me  at  Gettysburg." 

'Must  before  the  battle  of  Gettysburg"  leaves  a  short  space  of  time 
to  have  allowed  of  such  a  belief,  considering  that  General  Meade  had 
not  expected  to  be  placed  in  command  of  the  army;  that  he  took  com 
mand  of  it  on  the  28th  of  June  ;  that  the  corps  were  widely  separated, 
feeling  for  the  enemy,  preparatory  to  concentration;  and  that  battle 
evidently  could  not  be  long  postponed,  as  in  point  of  fact  the  first 
clay's  encounter  was  on  the  1st  of  July.  It  is  strange  that  General 
Doubleday,  upon  having  his  suspicions  aroused  ajust  before  the  battle 
of  Gettysburg,"  did  not  discard  the  unworthy  thought  upon  which 
they  turned  with  regard  to  General  Meade,  if  not  from  the  point  of 
view  of  being  unworthy  and  unwarrantable,  at  least  from  the  percep 
tion  that  under  the  circumstance  of  General  Meade' s  having  so 
much  soliciting  his  attention,  it  was  almost  impossible  that  he  could 
have  conceived  and  communicated  any  such  intention.  Not  only  was 
this  not  so ;  but  we  find  General  Doubleday  accounting  for  the  undue 
harshness  of  his  testimony  against  General  Meade,  nine  months  after 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  by  the  fact  that  he  was  still  laboring  under 
the  false  impression  there  received  regarding  General  Meade's  inten 
tions. 

Now,  for  the  first  time,  in  his  late  letter,  he  grants  that  his  lan 
guage  in  his  testimony  against  General  Meade  before  the  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  was  unduly  harsh.  It  has  taken,  then, 
nearly  twenty  years  to  bring  him  to  this  amende  honorable ;  but,  un 
happily,  there  is  a  remarkable  coincidence  in  point  of  time  between 
it  and  the  appearance  of  Mr.  Swinton's  strictures  upon  his  book. 

Discrepancies  of  statement  apart,  General  Doubleday  is  in  any 
case  unfitted  for  the  task  of  an  historian,  as  proved  by  the  facts  that 
he  believes  readily  and  implicitly  on  hearsay  ;  that  he  is  not  open  to 
correction  of  false  impressions  ;  that  even  after  a  long  interval  of 
time,  nearly  twenty  years,  he  is  ignorant  of  his  ground,  or  sure  of  it 
only  from  his  belief  in  the  ignorance  of  others  as  to  what  is  contained 
in  the  national  archives  of  the  war. 

The  reader  curious  in  historical  matters   will  naturally  desire  to 


28 

know  what  that  action  of  General  Meade's  at  Gettysburg  could  have 
been  towards  General  Doubleday,  for  which  General  Doubleday  no 
longer  blamed  him  as  soon  as  his  false  impressions  regarding  General 
Meade  had  been  dissipated.  General  Meade,  upon  learning  of  the 
fall  of  General  Reynolds,  commanding  the  First  Corps,  at  once  sent 
orders  to  General  Newton,  commanding  a  division  of  the  Sixth  Corps, 
to  go  immediately  to  Gettysburg  and  assume  command  of  the  First 
Corps,  thus  relieving  and  superseding  General  Doubleday,  who,  as 
senior  officer,  had  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the  Corps  upon  the 
death  of  its  gallant  and  able  chief.  The  action  was  not  induced  by 
some  foolish  remarks  of  General  Doubleday's,  which  he  imagined  had 
reached  his  general,  but  solely  by  that  general's  view  as  to  the 
qualifications  of  a  corps  commander.  The  reader  is  now  in  a  position 
to  judge  whether  or  not  General  Doubleday's  knowledge  of  and  belief 
in  General  Meade's  alleged  intentions  is  an  extraordinary  coincidence 
with  his  being  superseded  as  commander  of  the  First  Corps.  Two 
days  after  the  battle  General  Doubleday  was  relieved  from  duty  with 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  went  to  Washington,  where  he  remained 
until  the  close  of  the  war. 

When  the  announcement  was  made  that  General  Doubleday  had 
been  selected  to  write  the  volume  in  the  Scribner's  Series,  covering 
the  campaign  and  battle  of  Gettysburg,  it  was  generally  considered 
the  most  extraordinary  choice  that  could  have  been  made,  to  produce 
what  was  at  the  same  time  announced  as  "  a  full  and  authoritative 
military  history"  of  that  important  part  of  the  war.  General  Double- 
day's  work,  however,  surpassed  all  expectations,  for  a  more  incon 
gruous,  bitterly  prejudiced,  and  unreliable  performance  cannot  be 
imagined.  It  was  fondly  hoped,  from  the  almost  universal  condem 
nation  the  book  received,  that  that  was  the  last  that  would  be  heard 
of  it,  or  of  him  as  an  author. 

Of  the  distinguished  officers  mentioned,  whose  names  are  indissolu- 
bly  associated  with  the  grand  achievements  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  at  Gettysburg,  who  in  hearty  support  of  their  commanding 
general  battled  bravely  on  those  historic  hills,  each  in  his  own  sphere 
doing  the  best  that  in  him  lay  for  his  country's  cause,  who  are  revered 
by  the  veterans  of  the  army  as  the  ideal  of  all  that  is  able,  brave, 
and  true,  we  find  arrayed  on  their  commanding  general's  side,  Sedg- 
wick,  Hancock,  Sykes,  Newton,  Howard,  Gibbon,  A.  S.  Williams, 
Hunt,  Warren,  Seth  Williams;  and  in  sorry  contrast,  Doubleday, 
Butterfield,  and  Pleasonton.  It  is  high  time  that  dispute  should 
cease  as  to  the  award  due  him  who  won  the  greatest  battle  of  the 


29 

war,  upon  which  it  turned,  saving  the  nation's  capital  and  giving  to 
the  Rebellion  a  blow  from  which  it  never  recovered.  It  must  cease, 
under  penalty  of  the  malcontents  making  themselves  and  the  nation 
ridiculous.  It  will  cease,  for  all  battles,  save  for  a  time  Gettysburg, 
have  been  universally  recognized  and  acknowledged  as  won  by  the 
general  in  command;  and  despite  all  its  escaped  heroes,  it  remains  for 
history  to  record  that,  from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  Rebellion, 
it  was  only  when  Meade  was  chief  that  Lee  was  ever  met  in  pitched 
battle  and  defeated  on  equal  terms. 


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